There is constant �iscussion in the aca�emic literature of the role an� signifi� cance of the institutions of the �retton�Woo�s system an� especially of the International Monetary Fun� (IMF) in the worl� economy an� in in�ivi�ual countries. The question of reforming the IMF becomes especially topical after the start of each more or less large�scale financial crisis. So it was after the crisis at the en� of the 1990s 1 ; an� this problem continues to be �iscusse� to�ay.
There is constant �iscussion in the aca�emic literature of the role an� signifi� cance of the institutions of the �retton�Woo�s system an� especially of the International Monetary Fun� (IMF) in the worl� economy an� in in�ivi�ual countries. The question of reforming the IMF becomes especially topical after the start of each more or less large�scale financial crisis. So it was after the crisis at the en� of the 1990s 1 ; an� this problem continues to be �iscusse� to�ay. 2 The nee� to reform international financial institutions an� the IMF in particular is not only acknowle�ge� by the latter: it has become one of the priorities in the work of the IMF un�er con�itions of financial crisis.
In or�er to work out a strategy for transforming these institutions, it is nec� essary to know about the mistakes that they have ma�e in various countries of the worl�. In the context of postcommunist transformation, analysis of their activity in the countries of the former Soviet Union is of special interest.
Of the post�Soviet countries, it is Georgia that has suffere� the �eepest economic �ecline. 4 Far from all of the economic transformations con�ucte� there have been justifie� an� effective. 5 IMF programs occupy a special place in the reform of the Georgian economy. Despite numerous miscalculations, 6 important economic successes have been achieve� on the basis of these programs. 7 In the present article, which is a continuation of a seven�year�ol� investigation, 8 I analyze the perio� since the "Rose Revolution." �esi�es the activity of the IMF, I examine the work that the Worl� �ank has �one throughout this perio�.
First, it is necessary to emphasize that the functions of these financial institutions are strictly �ivi�e�. The main focus of the IMF's activity is macroeconomic stability, while the programs of the Worl� �ank are aime� at economic reforms in general, at institutional transformation, an� at �evel� opment of infrastructure an� of sectors of the economy. Despite this �ivision into spheres of activity, certain issues belong simultaneously to the fiel�s of macroeconomic policy an� institutional transformation; these, naturally, require joint consi�eration.
While before the "Rose Revolution" members of the IMF mission simply offere� the government of Georgia erroneous recommen�ations, since 2004 both the IMF an� the Worl� �ank have looke� at the transformations carrie� out by the Georgian government (inclu�ing its mistakes) only through "rose� colore� spectacles" an� seen them in a rosy light. 9 On this basis, the mistakes of the IMF an� Worl� �ank may be calle� "rosy." �fter 1999, �ue to the inert character of the Georgian government, the in� ternational financial institutions (an� not they alone) lost hope in the ability of Georgia to return to the path of economic reform. The efforts of the Georgian government in the area of planning an� implementing the state bu�get looke� quite hopeless. En�less sequestrations ma�e it completely obvious that the government lacke� sufficient political will to fight corruption an� that it was therefore unable qualitatively to change the situation with regar� to tax collec� tion. �s a result, the IMF halte� cooperation with Georgia in summer 2003; this also le� automatically to curtailment of the program of the Worl� �ank. 10 It must be regar�e� as a special achievement of the postrevolutionary government that it acquire� the necessary political potential an� impose� financial or�er. Even in 2004 tax revenues �ouble�, an� the growth prom� ise� to be stable. This success, which was accompanie� by �eclarations of a�hesion to �emocratic values, ma�e a very strong impression on countries an� international organizations that were frien�ly to Georgia. The result was that the IMF renewe� its program in Georgia, an� this was followe� by an analogous �ecision of the Worl� �ank.
The success in fiscal policy (before the revolution it ha� been the govern� ment's "�chilles' heel")-the upwar� leap in bu�getary revenues-weakene� the influence of the international financial institutions over the Georgian government. The staff of the IMF mission consi�ere� that the government was coping successfully with the mobilization of bu�getary revenues an� that recommen�ations on this matter from the IMF might even be superfluous. Furthermore, while before 2004 the IMF ha� literally prevente� the Georgian government from changing the tax co�e, in 2004 it no longer blocke� a re�uc� tion in the tax bur�en, which came into effect in 2005.
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Of special significance in this context was a conflict between the Georgian government an� the hea�s of the IMF mission that became extremely acute in spring 2005 an� was connecte� mainly with the existence of extrabu�get� ary accounts. This conflict culminate� in the complete victory of the prime minister of Georgia, who in May 2005 visite� Washington an� �eman�e� that the IMF lea�ership replace the acting hea� of the mission. The profes� sionalism of the hea� of the mission coul� har�ly be �oubte�: his �eman�s ha� been justifie�. �evertheless, he was recalle�. This was a serious warn� ing to all members of the mission an� to its new hea�: any conflict with the Georgian government might put a sorry en� to the career of any one of them. The permanent representative of the IMF in Tbilisi eventually manage� to establish cooperation with the Georgian government in a form acceptable to both si�es, an� his stay in Georgia was exten�e� twice-something that hap� pens extremely rarely in IMF practice. �aturally, after this episo�e members of the IMF staff �i� not fin� it in their interest to enter into serious conflict with the Georgian government.
�t the beginning of autumn 2007 the IMF program came to an en�, an� the government ha� no plans to start a new program. Only after the RussianGeorgian conflict in �ugust 2008 �i� the IMF renew cooperation with the Georgian government.
Extrabudgetary accounts
�lmost imme�iately after the "Rose Revolution," extrabu�getary accounts were create� in the name of the force structures; former state officials who were accuse� of corruption pai� so�calle� free�om charges into these accounts after their arrest. It was consi�ere� that in this way people expose� as corrupt returne� stolen money an� property to the state, while the state gaine� an a�� �itional source of revenue. To be fair, it shoul� be note� that only part of the "free�om charges" en�e� up in these accounts; the rest accumulate� on the revenue si�e of the state bu�get.
It is of special importance that the spen�ing of extrabu�getary fun�s was a prerogative of the government an� was not subject to public oversight: information about extrabu�getary accounts was not available to parliament, to the �u�it Chamber of Georgia, or to the mass me�ia. Only the magnitu�e of correspon�ing accruals to the state bu�get was therefore known, while the volume of fun�s in extrabu�getary accounts was not even susceptible to expert assessment. It is clear that such a practice cannot ensure a stable source of revenue. Initially collections were more or less successful, but then the amounts col� lecte� from officials �ecline� significantly. So the government switche� its attention to business, compelling businessmen to pay so�calle� voluntary contributions into the extrabu�getary accounts. 12 It is necessary to acknowle�ge that the system of extrabu�getary accounts was first use� in Georgia as early as 1992. One of the chief measures initiate� by the IMF in the secon� half of 1994 was to ensure that by 1995 all such accounts shoul� either be ma�e part of the bu�get or be eliminate�. �gainst this backgroun�, it was unexpecte� that the IMF shoul� close its eyes to the reopening of such accounts after the "Rose Revolution." Unofficially the situation was explaine� in the IMF as follows: "If extrabu�getary accounts will help to re�uce the level of corruption in the country, then so be it!" They seeme� a lesser evil by comparison with bribery. �ut the IMF was mistaken in supporting the existence of a potentially corrupt an� opaque institution.
Only after businessmen began to be presse� for "voluntary contributions" �i� the IMF �eman� that the Georgian government abolish extrabu�getary accounts. The greatest an� most prolonge� resistance to this came from the Ministry of Defense, whose extrabu�getary account was close� last-in the spring of 2006. �s for the Worl� �ank, �espite its work against corruption it �i� not react in any way to the existence of extrabu�getary accounts.
Systematic violation of property rights
The greatest mistake ma�e by the postrevolutionary government has been its encroachment on the right to private property.
13 �eople have been compelle� by pressure from the force structures "voluntarily" to ce�e their property to the state. This process has been carrie� out un�er the cover of so�calle� �eprivatization, which is allege�ly �esigne� to correct the mistakes ma�e in the course of privatization up to 2004-that is, un�er the Shevar�na�ze a�ministration. In fact, there has been a re�istribution of property in favor of businessmen who have close connections with the authorities. In this case too, however, the Worl� �ank has not reacte� in any way.
True, the permanent representative of the IMF in Tbilisi has pointe� out the impermissibility of violations of property rights.
14 He �i� so, however, in an extraor�inarily mil� form an� his statement ha� no consequences of any kin�.
The selling off of state property
The large�scale privatization that was begun in 2004 has involve� the violation of legislation. It is precisely by such means that Russian, Kazakh, an� �rab capital has entere� Georgia. Often a contract conclu�e� between the state an� a new private owner has in�icate� a sum that is only a small fraction of that originally announce�. In the privatization of power engineering plants, for example, the Czech company Energo�pro �eclare� that it woul� pay $312 million for ownership rights, but later the sum in�icate� in the contract was just $123 million. 15 �ot infrequently, firms with �ubious foun�ers an� �ubious capital were create� for the purpose of privatizing certain objects, an� it was precisely these firms that won the correspon�ing ten�ers.
In some cases, another state became the owner of Georgian state property (for instance, after the sale of Tbilisi Gas [Tbilgaz] its owner became a state company of Kazakhstan); this cannot be consi�ere� privatization. Unfortu� nately, however, no one has hear� the Worl� �ank's opinion on this matter, although privatization is one of the most important issues for it.
Restriction of competition
�fter the "Rose Revolution" state institutions starte� to be �ismantle�, thereby weakening the Georgian state. In particular, at the en� of 2004, in the frame� work of the reforms being con�ucte�, the state antimonopoly service was abolishe�, an� this contribute� to growing monopolization of the market.
In October 2007, at a session of the government, the presi�ent of Georgia entruste� the function of antimonopoly regulation of the markets in salt, sugar, an� other commo�ities to the Ministry of Internal �ffairs.
16 This is complete nonsense, because this function has no connection with the work of the police or of the state security service. (�nother curious inci�ent of this sort occurre� in spring 2006, when the presi�ent instructe� the minister of �efense to look for markets for the sale of Georgian wine.) This too, unfortunately, faile� to attract the attention of the Worl� �ank.
Manipulation of statistical data
Up to 2004 the State Department of Statistics (SDS) was �irectly subor�inate� to the country's presi�ent. In 2004 the �epartment was incorporate� into the Ministry of Economic Development; this is absur�, for it means that the gov� ernment not only works out an� implements one or another economic policy but also publishes statistical information about the �egree of success of this policy.* �s a result, the statistical service now performs the same political function in Georgia as it �i� in the Soviet Union.
In �ugust 2006, the SDS reporte� that the annual inflation rate as of July was 14.5 percent. The country's central bank-the �ational �ank of Georgia (��G)-an� the government were rightly criticize� by the permanent repre� sentative of the IMF in Tbilisi. �ut as a result the government �ismisse� the chairman of the SDS an� the official who succee�e� him was instructe� by the prime minister gra�ually to "lower" the inflation in�icators. The government �eclare� that as of December 2006 the inflation rate in Georgia ha� fallen to 8.8 percent; formally this satisfie� the IMF requirement that the rate shoul� not reach �ouble figures. �part from the government, no one in Georgia believe� the official inflation estimate, but the IMF not only ma�e no protest at this "solution" to the inflation problem but even gave a positive appraisal of the work of the ��G an� of the Georgian government as a whole.
Populism of the government
Unfortunately, after the revolution the Georgian government starte� to carry out populist economic programs, lea�ing in practice to rising inflation. � spe� cial place among these programs is occupie� by measures that have the noble aim of increasing employment: employers are require� to place unemploye� people in their firms for a perio� of three months with the state paying their wages, which rose from 150 lari per month in 2006 to 200 lari in 2007-8. �s a result, tens of millions of lari have been spent from the state bu�get, but only a few in�ivi�uals have obtaine� long�term employment. In the majority of cases, the employer an� the unemploye� person reach an un�erstan�ing: the former is willing to sign any �ocument stating that a specific person really is going to work an� �oing something in his firm, while the unemploye� person is gla� to receive 450 lari (later 600 lari) over three months for �oing nothing. Some employers agree to sign the correspon�ing �ocuments only if they are given half of the sum receive� from the state. �s a result, the work placement program amounts to an unemployment benefits program. The a��itional money release� onto the consumer market has, of course, fuele� inflation. Moreover, before the elections the government initiate� a program for stu�ents to clean up the city; this also a��e� to inflation. Over the winter of 2007-8 the popula� tion was given vouchers, pai� for from the state bu�get, for the purchase of *In Georgia, as in other post�Soviet states, the government un�er the prime minister is �istinct from the presi�ent.-Trans. various commo�ities, an� the level of inflation rose even higher. �n� although controlling inflation is one of the most important functions of the IMF, it has not respon�e� with any warnings to the government.
A taxation oddity
In 2006, on the initiative of the presi�ent, the 20 percent social tax an� the 12 percent income tax became a single income tax set at 25 percent. 17 The correspon�ing change in the taxation co�e entere� into force in 2007. �s the income tax an� the social tax are calculate� on �ifferent bases (the income tax is �e�ucte� from wages, while the social tax is base� on the wage fun�), it is impossible in principle to combine them, an� it is har� to imagine the specialists at the IMF not knowing about this. In essence, the social tax on employers was abolishe� while the income tax on employees was increase� from 12 percent to 25 percent.
Program to overcome poverty
�s early as 2003, a program of economic �evelopment an� poverty re�uc� tion was prepare� an� affirme� by the presi�ent; it then ha� strong approval from the IMF, Worl� �ank, an� other international institutions, which ha� participate� actively in its preparation.
18 �ut the government at that time was quite incapable of functioning an� �i� not even begin to implement this pro� gram. The new authorities, rejecting everything �one before them, assigne� it to oblivion for four years. �evertheless, both the IMF an� the Worl� �ank publicly �eclare� that they were assisting in the implementation of a poverty re�uction program in Georgia. Moreover, in September 2007 the IMF even announce� that the program ha� been successfully complete�. This was prob� ably far from being the case, consi�ering that in 2008 the authorities �eclare� anew the start of the fight against poverty. However, it is a mere formality to call the preelectoral program un�er the slogan "� Unite� Georgia Without �overty!" a "program" at all, inasmuch as the �ocument containe� only a�� jurations, sprea� over several pages.
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A free economic zone-an economic trap
The i�ea of a free economic zone (or an economic space in which privileges of various sorts are grante� that �o not apply in the rest of the country) is as� sociate� with the name of �slan �bashi�ze, the former lea�er of �jaria. Un�er con�itions of economic liberalization the creation of a free economic zone is superfluous, 20 but neither �bashi�ze nor the postrevolutionary government took this into account. 21 The situation is complicate� by the fact that the Georgian economy is cur� rently suffering from an investment "famine." To create a free economic zone un�er these con�itions (the authorities have �eci�e� to put this i�ea into effect in the port city of �oti) will exacerbate the shortage of investment, thereby impe�ing economic �evelopment as a whole. �oth foreign an� �omestic investors will put money only into the free economic zone aroun� �oti. �n� this means that the economic �evelopment of �oti an� the a�jacent areas will take place at the expense of the rest of Georgia.
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The IMF specialists hel� a seminar for those government ministers an� members of parliament who are responsible for making economic policy, �evote� to the negative consequences of creating free economic zones in countries suffering from an investment "famine." They recommen�e� in a mil� manner that the Georgian government shoul� not create a free economic zone, but no hee� was taken of them.
Why has the IMF, in �ealing with this problem, acte� behin� the scenes rather than publicly? �fter all, it ha� a joint program with the Georgian gov� ernment that allowe� it to convey its �eman�s more firmly. �s later became clear, one of the experts of the Worl� �ank, even before the seminar was hel�, ha� given the authorities in the name of the bank a positive recommen�ation: the IMF wishe� to avoi� an institutional confrontation with the Worl� �ank. In this way, the economic interests of Georgia receive� short shrift.
Rejection of an independent central bank
�s early as spring 2006, the Georgian government inten�e� to curtail the powers of the �ational �ank of Georgia (��G) an� to this en� prepare� �raft amen�ments to the law on the ��G, �esigne� to transfer the function of banking oversight to an agency specially create� for this purpose. These plans coul� not be carrie� out �ue to resistance from the �irectors of the ��G an� from the parliamentary committee for finance an� bu�get. In spring 2008, when the presi�ent of the ��G ha� retire� an� his �uties were being performe� by the vice presi�ent, the government seize� the moment an� (�espite the opposition of the parliamentary committee) �eprive� the ��G of the power to exercise banking oversight, leaving it the sole function of regulating inflation. The IMF voice� in a memoran�um the mo�est request not to violate the in�epen�ence of the ��G. �ut no one was oblige� to take any notice because by spring 2008 the IMF no longer ha� a program in Georgia.
Emission of Eurobonds and increase in the country's foreign debt
�fter the "Rose Revolution" there was stable growth in revenues to the state bu�get. �evertheless, in spring 2008 the government ma�e an emission of Eurobon�s, thereby increasing the country's foreign �ebt by $500 million.
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The Georgian government has never state� the purpose of this borrowing, an� so the taxpayers, who will have to repay 7.5 percent of the total cre�it each year up to 2013, remain ignorant of the plans for spen�ing the borrowe� money. �las, neither the Georgian government nor the IMF has given any sort of explanation of this senseless emission.
"Green Friday"
�fter the "Rose Revolution" the Georgian economy began to fall sick with one of the varieties of "Dutch �isease." 24 � substantial inflow of foreign currency resulte�, above all, from the growth of foreign �irect investment (FDI) an� from monetary transfers by Georgian citizens living abroa�. 25 In autumn 2008, with the start of the global financial crisis, these sources �rie� up. The Georgian-Russian military conflict in �ugust 2008 also ha� a negative effect on FDI. 26 It became obvious that objective con�itions neces� sitate� �evaluation of the national currency. �ut instea� of carrying out a gra�ual �evaluation of the lari, the ��G hel� the exchange rate practically unchange� for forty �ays, expen�ing a fifth of its foreign currency reserves in the process.
On Fri�ay, �ovember 7, 2008, the exchange rate of the �ollar flew up: in the morning a �ollar cost 1.44 lari; by the evening the cash machines were empty an� the exchange rate at the currency exchange points stoo� at 1.65, although no one was selling �ollars. �fter completion of the first �eal, tra�� ing at the Interbank Currency Exchange (ICE) was halte�, suppose�ly for technical reasons; this cause� a panic. 27 With four times as many importe� as �omestically pro�uce� goo�s on Geor� gia's consumer market, "Green Fri�ay" brought about a rise in prices, because importers �i� not un�erstan� what further steps the ��G woul� take.
In October 2008, a conference took place in �russels un�er the aegis of the Worl� �ank at which it was �eci�e� to allocate Georgia $4.55 billion in financial ai� ($2 billion as grants, the rest as loans). This money is inten�e� to cover the economic an� social losses borne by Georgia as a result of the �ugust war. 28 For its part, the IMF also allocate� $750 million for the purpose of macroeconomic stabilization. 29 Such a substantial inflow of foreign currency in principle exclu�es the possibility of a currency crisis in Georgia, but, unfor� tunately, the country is not insure� against a repetition of "Green Fri�ay." 30 * * * Whether the postrevolutionary transformations in Georgia were real reforms or simply the �estruction of previous institutions (as, for instance, in the case of the antimonopoly service), with the assistance of the international financial organizations all of them were eventually calle� reforms, an� one of the agencies that issues international business ratings move� Georgia up from one�hun�re� twelfth to thirty�seventh, then to eighteenth, an� finally to fifteenth place. 31 �ut the pru�ent entrepreneur will har�ly prefer to �o business in Georgia, where elementary property rights are not protecte�, rather than in Swe�en or Germany, which the same rating agency assigns to seventeenth an� twenty�fifth place, respectively. Ratings are, as a rule, �etermine� on the basis of information obtaine� from expert surveys, an� these take no account of the problems that I have examine� in this article.
For Georgia, as for any other country, it is important that the international financial institutions shoul� not only patch up holes in the state bu�get but also provi�e competent a�vice. �n�, obviously, harm is �one to a country when they acquiesce in mistakes ma�e by its government. �lthough I �o not �oubt for a secon� that there are qualifie� specialists at the IMF an� Worl� �ank, the experience of postrevolutionary Georgia bears witness to the nee� to reform these institutions: their work shoul� be gui�e� primarily by profes� sional values an� not by consi�erations of any other kin�.
Notes
